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ICSID Jurisprudence: Between Homogeneity and Heterogeneity  
A Call for Appeal? 
 




The mythical Zaleukos from the former Greek city Epizephyrian Locroi, in south-west Italy, 
is deemed to be Europe’s first lawmaker.1 In the middle of the 7th century BC, he created  
written laws in order to harmonise divergent judicial decisions and to put an end to haphazard 
interpretations.2 Moreover, he set a high value on safeguarding the consistent interpretation of 
legal rules in his own legislation as well. It is chronicled that advocates of different 
interpretations of a norm had to defend their position before the “Assembly of the 
Thousand”.3 It has been reported that he whose interpretation did not correspond to the actual 
will of the legislator was strangled.4 This could also happen to the high Magistrate of the city 
who was inter alia  entrusted with the interpretation of legal rules in controversial cases.5 In 
other words, his decisions were appealable as well.6 And although these laws were 
characterized by great strictness, the fact is that twenty-eight centuries ago the safeguarding of 
consistency in adjudication constituted an integral part of the legislation of Zaleukos, a 
legislation which corresponded to the institutional needs of his epoch.7 
 
The issue of the coherence of judicial decisions was also addressed by the Secretariat of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in its discussion paper for 
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“Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration” in the year 2004. Although 
the paper argued that “[s]ignificant inconsistencies have not to date been a general feature of 
the jurisprudence of ICSID”, it proposed the establishment of an ICSID appeals institution 
which would be intended to foster homogeneity and consistency in the case-law.8 According 
to the Working Paper of the next year, however, the debate about the establishment of an 
ICSID appeals facility had to be postponed, for it was considered “premature” to attempt to 
establish an ICSID appeal mechanism.9 Since then, considerable time has elapsed, further 
ICSID procedures have been initiated and new cases have been adjudicated. This begs the 
question whether the ICSID jurisprudence proves yet to be so inconsistent that the ICSID 
system is, indeed, in need of an appellate instance.10 
After presenting the institutional structure and the review mechanism of the current ICSID 
system, the present paper tests the homogeneity of the ICSID case-law, using as example the 
ICSID jurisprudence regarding the state of necessity and the most-favoured nation clause. It 
should be emphasized that it does not deal with dogmatic analyses, but rather focuses on 
specific methodological and interpretational issues of the cases selected.  
  
II. ICSID System: Institutional Structure and Review Mechanism 
The Centre is hitherto the sole institutionalised forum which is exclusively entrusted with the 
administration and the supervision of the settlement of investment disputes between foreign 
private investors and states. It was established under the auspices of the World Bank in 1965 
through the ICSID Convention which provides for the mandate, the organisation and the core 
functions of the Centre. The primary purpose of the ICSID Convention consists in promoting 
foreign investments and, consequently, economic development by ensuring the fair, effective 
and impartial settlement of investment disputes.11 The settlement of investment disputes, in 
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turn, is carried out by the ICSID arbitral tribunals which are non-permanent judicial bodies. In 
other words, every separate case is adjudicated by a different ICSID tribunal.  
 
Until the mid-1990s the Centre led a rather shadowy existence. During the years 1966 and 
1993 there were only 27 ICSID arbitration proceedings.12 However, the proliferation of the 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) has led the ICSID jurisprudence to a “baby boom”.13 In 
fact, by the end of June 2007 the total number of cases registered with ICSID amounted to 
236.14 This growth may be traced back to the special features of these treaties. In particular, 
BITs establish comprehensive international standards for the protection of international 
investments and they make it possible for private investors to initiate ICSID arbitral 
proceedings against host states directly, regardless of whether a contractual agreement has 
been concluded between the host state and the foreign investor. This kind of arbitration has 
been aptly described as “arbitration without privity”.15 More often than not, BITs contain 
similar or identical vague provisions whose interpretation and elaboration is subject to the 
jurisprudence of the different ICSID arbitral tribunals. 
 
According to Article 53 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID awards shall not be subject to any 
other remedy except those provided for in the Convention itself. This provision reflects the 
so-called self-contained and exhaustive character of the ICSID review system.16 Thus, the 
possibility of any review of ICSID awards through national courts or other international fora 
is excluded. The only remedy available to set aside an ICSID award is the annulment 
procedure pursuant to Article 52 which is carried out by an ad hoc Committee. The latter can 
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annul an award only on one or more of the five grounds set forth in Article 52(1).17 More 
important is the fact, though, that Article 53 of the ICSID Convention prohibits any appellate 
review within the ICSID system expressly and absolutely by stating that an award “shall not 
be subject to any appeal”.18 Hence, an examination by the ad hoc Committee of whether a 
case was rightly decided as to the law or the facts is excluded.19 As the ad hoc Committee 
vividly pointed out in the annulment proceedings in Lucchetti in September 2007: 
However, even if the reasons in the Award were wrong, this would not justify annulment of the 
Award, because it is not within the province of an ad hoc committee to review a tribunal’s 
finding that it lacked jurisdiction. Lucchetti’s request for annulment is in reality an appeal 
against the Tribunal’s decision that it did not have jurisdiction ratione temporis under Article 2 
of the BIT. Appeals are not permitted, and the Committee may not review the Tribunal’s 
findings of fact and law.20 (emphasis added) 
 
In other words, annulment concerns the legitimacy of the process of decision rather than its 
substantive correctness.21 This manifests the intention of the founding fathers of ICSID to 
create a review mechanism of limited scope  for unusual situations.22  
 
Even so, in the mid-1980s the ad hoc Committee performed a review of the substantive 
correctness of initial awards in the annulment cases Klöckner I 23 and Amco I 24, which 
constitute the so-called “first generation of annulment proceedings”.25 The ad hoc Committee 
was widely criticized for failing to respect the distinction between annulment and appeal 
pursuant to the ICSID Convention.26 However, the fears heralding the “Breakdown of the 
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Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration”27 did not come true, for all subsequent ad hoc 
Committees respected the limited and exceptional character of the annulment process,28 and 
so the “ICSID experiment seem[ed] back on track”29.  
 
Yet, parties dissatisfied with an award attempt to set it aside or to achieve indirectly a review 
of its legal correctness by requesting annulment. In addition to the aforementioned passage of 
the annulment proceedings in Lucchetti, this is characteristically illustrated by the annulment 
proceedings in CMS of the 25th September 2007. Argentina argued before the ad hoc 
Committee that the interpretation of Article XI of the Argentina-US BIT by the initial ICSID 
tribunal constituted a manifest excess of powers pursuant to Article 52(1)b of the ICSID 
Convention.30 Interestingly, the Committee identified two errors of law with respect to the 
interpretation of Article XI, and pointed out that these very errors “could have had a decisive 
impact on the operative part of the Award”.31 Moreover, it added: 
[i]f the Committee was acting as a court of appeal, it would have to reconsider the Award on this 
ground.32 
 
Be that as it may, the fact is that the erroneous interpretation had to remain intact, since 
pursuant to the ICSID Convention the exclusion of appeal is absolute. This explicit exclusion 
of appeal intends to preserve the finality of ICSID awards. But at what cost?33 
 
III. Consistency in Jurisprudence: Preliminary Remarks  
At the level of international law there is no principle of binding precedents (stare decisis) 
similar to the common law tradition. For instance, according to Article 59 of the Statute of the 
ICJ “the decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect 
of that particular case”. Similarly, Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention provides that “[t]he 
award shall be binding on the parties”. The absence of a formal binding precedent does not 
                                                 
27
 Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, Duke Law Journal (1989), 
739 et seq. 
28
 Schreuer, supra n. 16, 903; Torsten Lörcher, ICSID-Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, Zeitschrift für Schiedsverfahren 
(2005), 11, 18-19. 
29
 Reisman, supra n. 11, 133. 
30
 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Annulment 
Decision, 25 September 2007, para. 128, available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CMSAnnulmentDecision.pdf. 
31
 Ibid., para. 135. 
32
 Ibid., para. 135. 
33
 See also Eric Schwartz, Finality at What Cost? The Decision of Ad Hoc Committee in Wena Hotels v. Egypt,  
in Gaillard/Banifatemi supra n. 19, 43 et seq. 
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mean that the international jurisprudence develops at random. In fact, the jurisprudence of the 
ICJ is characterized by a high degree of consistency.34 As the ICJ aptly pointed out: 
Thus the justice of which equity is an emanation, is not abstract justice but justice according to 
the rule of law: which is to say that its application should display consistency and a degree of 
predictability ; 35 
 
In the same vein, the ECtHR emphasized:  
While the Court is not formally bound to follow any of its previous judgments, it is in the 
interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, 
without cogent reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases.36 
 
For its part, the ICSID Tribunal in Saipem referred to its duty to secure the homogeneity of 
the ICSID jurisprudence in order to meet the requirements of the rule of law. In the words of 
the Tribunal: 
The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the same time, it is of the 
opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals. It 
believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established 
in a series of consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and 
of the circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious 
development of investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the 
community of States and investors towards certainty of the rule of law.37 
 
Accordingly, a consistent jurisprudence secures the credibility and the stability of any legal 
system.38 Lack of homogeneity calls its legitimacy into question.39  
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IV. Testing the Homogeneity of the ICSID Jurisprudence 
The homogeneity test concerns the interpretation of similar or identical vague clauses laid 
down in BITs by the different ICSID tribunals. The rules of interpretation pursuant to Articles 
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT) will be used as 
consistency benchmarks. According to the prevailing scholarly opinion and to the repeated 
affirmations of the ICJ as well as of the WTO Appellate Body, they reflect international 
customary law.40 Such affirmations ensure the parties to a dispute that the credibility of the 
relevant dispute settlement mechanism is beyond question.41 In fact, it is the method of 
interpretation that determines which results a rule will have.42 In addition, it is examined 
whether the ICSID tribunals take into account previous ICSID awards and to what extent they 
distinguish their rulings from prior ICSID decisions. In the end, it will be shown that the 
contemporary ICSID regime features a serious institutional deficit.  
 
A. Most-Favoured-Nation Clause 
1. Introduction 
Under a most-favoured-nation clause (MFN clause) a contracting party to an investment 
treaty undertakes the obligation to treat investors of the other contracting state no less 
favourably than investors of a third country.43 This means that if one state party to a BIT 
(basis treaty) has concluded a BIT with a third state (third party treaty) which favours 
investors of the third state over those of the other party to the basis treaty, then investors of 
the other party to the basis treaty are entitled to claim the additional benefits set forth in the 
third party treaty.44 In fact, the purpose of the MFN clause of a BIT is to protect foreign 
investors against discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis nationals of third countries.45 The scope 
of application of the MFN clause is determined by the so-called ejusdem generis principle. 
Accordingly, such a clause “can only attract matters belonging to the same category of 
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Préparatoires in Treaty Interpretation?, Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 50 (2003), 267, 271, 
footnotes 13 and 16 respectively.  
41
 Ibid., 271-272; 
42
 Ibid., 274. 
43
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subjects as that to which the clause itself relates”.46 The application of this rule, though, 
presupposes a decision as to what subject-matters are of the same category.47 Traditionally, 
the MFN clause covers substantive rights and obligations.48 In a series of cases brought before 
the ICSID Centre, however, ICSID tribunals had to deal with the question of whether this 
clause applies also to procedural aspects of investment protection, and specifically to dispute 
settlement provisions. 
2. Case-law  
aa.  Maffezini v. Spain (Orrego Vicuña, Buergenthal, Wolf), 25 January 2000 
The question of the applicability of an MFN clause to dispute settlement mechanisms was 
addressed for the first time in the seminal case of Maffezini. According to the dispute 
settlement clause of the Argentina-Spain BIT, submission of an investment dispute to 
international arbitration requires the expiration of a period of eighteen months within which 
the domestic courts of the host state must settle the dispute (18-month-clause). By invoking 
the MFN clause of the aforementioned BIT, the investor claimed that he could benefit from 
the more favourable dispute settlement provision of the Chile-Spain BIT which provided for 
international arbitration after the expiration of a six month negotiation period. In other words, 
the Tribunal had to decide whether the 18-month-provision of the Argentina-Spain BIT could 
be bypassed by virtue of the MFN-clause regarding “all matters” subject to the treaty.      
  
After stressing the fact that the MFN clause at issue had a broad wording and did not provide 
for any specific reference to dispute settlement provisions, the Tribunal articulated its 
approach with respect to the interpretation of the MFN clause as follows: 
[I]t must be established whether the omission [to provide expressly that dispute settlement as 
such is covered by the clause] was intended by the parties or can reasonably be inferred from the 
practice followed by the parties in their treatment of foreign investors and their own investors.49 
 
By using this wording, this decision seems to assume that as a rule the MFN clause covers 
dispute settlement provisions of the third party treaty, unless the interpretation of the clause or 
the subsequent practice of the contracting states with respect to the conclusion of BITs leads 
                                                 
46
 Ambatielos Claim, (Greece v. United Kingdom), Arbitration Commission, 06 March 1956, ILR Vol. 23 
(1956), 306, 319. 
47
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49
 Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000, para. 53, available 
at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Maffezini-Jurisdiction-English_000.pdf. 
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to the opposite result.50 In other words, the interpretation appears to be subject to an 
investment-friendly approach. 
 
In construing the MFN clause as such, the Tribunal held: 
54. Notwithstanding the fact that the basic treaty containing the clause does not refer expressly 
to dispute settlement as covered by the most favored nation clause, the Tribunal considers that 
there are good reasons to conclude that today dispute settlement arrangements are inextricably 
related to the protection of foreign investors, as they are also related to the protection of rights of 
traders under treaties of commerce. 
… 
55. International arbitration and other dispute settlement arrangements have replaced these older 
and frequently abusive practices of the past. These modern developments are essential, however, 
to the protection of the rights envisaged under the pertinent treaties; they are also closely linked 
to the material aspects of the treatment accorded. Traders and investors, like their States of 
nationality, have traditionally felt that their rights and interests are better protected by recourse 
to international arbitration than by submission of disputes to domestic courts, while the host 
governments have traditionally felt that the protection of domestic courts is to be preferred.“ 
 
On this point, the clause was construed in the light of the historical purpose of international 
arbitration in abstracto. This extreme teleological interpretation51 is hardly compatible with 
the objective approach embodied in Article 31 of the VCLT according to which the authentic 
expression of the will of the parties is to be derived from the text of a treaty.52 In fact, 
recourse to such a subjective method is neither a usual nor a recognized interpretative tool. 
Furthermore, no attention was paid to the contextual element of interpretation. Therefore, the 
demand of Article 31 VCLT to consider each of the three main elements when interpreting a 
treaty, namely the text, its systematic context as well as the object and purpose of the treaty,53 
was not taken into account.  
 
After formulating a general principle according to which the extension of the MFN clause to 
dispute settlement provisions is fully compatible with ejusdem generis rule, the Tribunal went 
on to identify some “public policy considerations” in order to narrow the broad scope of the 
MFN clause, e.g. the exhaustion of local remedies, dispute settlement subject to “a fork in the 
                                                 
50
 Locknie Hsu, MFN and Dispute Settlement-When the Twain Meet, Journal of World Investment & Trade, 
Vol. 7 (2006), 25, 28.  
51
 See Crnic-Grotic, Object and Purpose of Treaties in the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, Asian 
Yearbook of International Law Vol. 7 (1997), 141, 164. 
52
 Report of the International Law Commission, 18. Session, Draft Articles on the Law of the Treaties with 
Commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. II (1966), 187, 220, para. 11; Sir Ian 
Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd Ed. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
1984, 115; Alfred Verdross/Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht, 3. Auflage, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 
1984, 492, para. 776. 
53
 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 187. 
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road clause”,54 a dispute settlement clause providing for a particular arbitration forum such as 
ICSID, or agreement to a highly institutionalised system of arbitration.55 Again, the 
articulation of these limitations was not derived from an interpretation of the BIT under the 
rules of the VCLT.56 
bb. Siemens v. Argentina (Rigo Sureda, Brower, Bello Janeiro), 03 August 2004 
Similar to the Maffezini case, the Siemens decision held that by virtue of the MFN clause the 
investor could bypass the 18-month-clause of the Germany-Argentina BIT by “borrowing”  
the dispute settlement mechanism of the Chile-Argentina BIT which provided for 
international arbitration after the expiration of a six month negotiation period. A considerable 
difference among them is that the present Tribunal followed the process of interpretation as 
described in the VCLT.57 However, the guideline of the interpretation constituted the purpose 
of the BIT as laid down in its preamble, namely the promotion and protection of foreign 
investments.58 In other words, in reading the clause the Tribunal was led by an investment-
friendly approach.  
 
With respect to the interpretation of the MFN clause as such, considerable weight was put 
upon the teleological element. Hence, the purpose of the clause was understood as to “to 
eliminate the effect of specially negotiated provisions unless they have been excepted”.59 It is, 
therefore, not surprising that, although the Tribunal recognized that the wording of the MFN 
clause contained in the Germany-Argentina BIT was narrower than that in the Maffezini case, 
it considered such a difference in wording to be irrelevant.60 As a result, the explicit rejection 
                                                 
54
 Such a clause gives to the investor an irrevocable option to choose between the litigation of its claims in the 
domestic courts of the host state or international arbitration; see, in particular, Christoph Schreuer, Traveling the 
BIT Route - Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, Journal of World Investment & Trade 
Vol. 5 (2004), 231, 239 et seq.     
55
 Maffezini, supra n. 49, para. 63; for a more detailed analysis see Dolzer/Myers, supra n. 44, 54.  
56
 Hsu, supra n. 50, 29; Gaillard, supra n. 45, 2. 
57
 Siemens v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004, para. 81,  




 Ibid., para. 106. 
60
 Ibid., para. 103: “The arbitral tribunal in Maffezini noted that Spain had used the expression “all matters 
subject to this Agreement” only in the case of its BIT with Argentina and “this treatment” in all other cases. The 
said tribunal commented that the latter was “of course a narrower formulation”.
 
The Tribunal concurs that the 
formulation is narrower but, as concluded above, it considers that the term “treatment” and the phrase “activities 
related to the investments” are sufficiently wide to include settlement of disputes.” See also Dana Freyer/David 
Herlihy, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and Dispute Settlement in Investment Arbitration: Just How “Favored” 
is “Most-Favored”?, ICSID Review/FILJ vol. 20 (2005), 58, 72; Omar Garcia-Bolivar, The Teleology of 
International Investment Law - The Role of Purpose in the Interpretation of International Investments 
Agreements, Journal of World Investment & Trade Vol. 6 (2005), 751, 765; for a more detailed analysis and 
criticism see Stephen Fietta, Most favoured nation treatment and dispute resolution under bilateral investment 
treaties: a turning point?, Transnational Dispute Management Vol. 2 (June 2005), 1, 8. 
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of a broad interpretation of the clause at the beginning of the analysis of the Tribunal61 seems 
to have a symbolic nature. 
cc. Salini v. Jordan (Guillaume, Cremades, Sinclair), 29 November 2004 
In Salini case, the claimants invoked the MFN clause of the Italy-Jordan BIT in order to bring 
contractual claims before an ICSID tribunal, notwithstanding the fact that according to Article 
9 (2) of the BIT such contractual disputes should be governed by the settlement procedure 
foreseen in the contract. Specifically, they contended that the MFN clause could import the 
dispute settlement provisions of the Jordan-USA and the Jordan-United Kingdom BITs which 
entitled them to refer to ICSID any dispute arising from their construction contracts. 
 
The course of interpretation in Salini is characterized by a strict, thought not expressly 
mentioned, application of the VCLT rules.62 Unlike Maffezini and Siemens, this case is 
featured by a narrower understanding of the function of the MFN clause, since the Tribunal 
denied its extension to dispute settlement provisions. The starting point of the interpretation 
was the text of the MFN clause which was distinguished from the wider wording of the 
respective MFN clause in Maffezini.63 Yet, this distinction alone cannot justify this narrower 
understanding, since the Siemens decision advocated a wide interpretation of an MFN 
provision with an identical scope of application.64 Decisive for the outcome of the decision 
appears to be in the first place that the Tribunal did not apply any presumption when 
construing the MFN clause.  
 
Furthermore, the Salini Tribunal attributed less weight to the element of interpretation 
pursuant to the object and purpose of the treaty. Instead, it emphasized the contextual method. 
Specifically, the MFN clause was construed in conjunction with the dispute settlement clause 
of the BIT. In contrast to Siemens and Maffezini, it was argued that the intention as expressed 
in the dispute settlement provision of the BIT, Article 9 (2), was to exclude that the parties to 
the BIT intended those provisions to be bypassed by virtue of the MFN clause.65 Finally, this 
decision shows a case-oriented character, since the Tribunal did not formulate any general 
principle regarding the function of the MFN clause.  
                                                 
61
 Siemens, supra n. 57, para. 81. 
62
 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 29. November 2004, para. 118, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/salini-decision.pdf. 
63
 Ibid., para. 118. 
64
 Both MFN clauses referred to treatment or activities related/granted to investors/investments; see also 
Freyer/Herlihy, supra n. 60, 74.   
65
 Salini, supra n. 62, para. 118; for an overview of different possible interpretations of an MFN clause see 
Freyer/Herlihy, supra n. 60, 62. 
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With respect to the consideration of previous cases, the Salini Tribunal elegantly criticized the 
approach taken in Maffezini.66 However, there was no reference to the Siemens case. 
Apparently, this could be explained by the fact that the latter decision was rendered just four 
months before the Salini decision. 
dd. Plama v. Bulgaria (Salans, van den Berg, Veeder), 08 February 2005 
Due to the fact that the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT contained  narrow dispute settlement provisions  
which were concerned only with disputes relating to expropriation and provided for 
international ad hoc, basically UNCITRAL, arbitration, the claimant relied upon the MFN 
clause of the aforementioned BIT in order to import broader dispute resolution clauses of 
other BITs concluded by Bulgaria, such as the Bulgaria-Finland BIT, which provide for 
ICSID arbitration. In other words, the Plama Tribunal had to decide whether the MFN 
provision could be interpreted as importing consent to ICSID arbitration. 
   
The distinctive feature of the Plama decision is the explicit and stepwise application of the 
rules of interpretation pursuant to the VCLT 67 as well as the fact that teleological 
interpretations in terms of the decisions in Maffezini and Siemens were rejected as 
“undeniable in generality” and “legally insufficient”.68 By invoking the principle that an 
agreement to arbitrate “should be clear and unambiguous”, the Court formulated a 
presumption which advocated a restrictive interpretation, based exclusively on the wording of 
the MFN clause. Accordingly, “the intention to incorporate dispute settlement provisions must 
                                                 
66
 Siemens, supra n. 57, para. 115 reads as follows: “The current Tribunal shares the concerns that have been 
expressed in numerous quarters with regard to the solution adopted in the Maffezini case. Its fear is that the 
precautions taken by authors of the award may in practice prove difficult to apply, thereby adding more 
uncertainties to the risk of “treaty shopping.” Indeed, the Maffezini decision caused reactions at the political 
level as well. Fearing an explosion of cases attempting to bypass dispute settlement provisions on the basis of 
MFN clauses, the negotiators of CAFTA [now DR-CAFTA, signed on: 05 August 2004] introduced into the 
CAFTA draft text a so-called “disappearing footnote” which specified that the MFN clause should not be 
understood in terms of the Maffezini case. This footnote disappeared from the final treaty text and was included 
in its negotiating history as a reflection of the intention of the parties. See, in particular, Ruth Teitelbaum, Who’s 
Afraid of Maffezini? Recent Developments in Interpretation of Most Favored Nation Clauses, Journal of 
International Arbitration, Vol. 22 (2005), 225, 228-229. In the same vein, the MFN provision of the Norwegian 
draft Model BIT [draft version of 19 December 2007] expressly states in Article 4 (3) that “[f]or greater 
certainty, treatment referred to in paragraph [1] does not encompass dispute resolution mechanisms provided for 




 Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 
2005,  para. 189-197, available at  http://ita.law.uvic.ca/chronological_list.htm. But see the criticism raised by 
Hsu, supra n. 50, 32-33. 
68
 Ibid., para. 193. 
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be clearly and unambiguously expressed”.69 Hence, the principle regarding the function of the 
MFN clause embodied in the cases of Maffezini and Siemens was reversed, since its extension 
to dispute settlement provisions was primarily denied.70 Finally, the court decided that the 
MFN clause could not be interpreted as providing consent to ICSID arbitration.71   
 
In considering previous ICSID decisions, the court held that the Maffezini approach could 
lead to a “chaotic situation” which “cannot be the presumed intent of Contracting Parties” and 
that the Siemens decision “illustrates the danger caused by the manner in which the Maffezini 
decision has approached the question”.72 These polemical statements towards the Maffezini 
and Siemens decisions, the adoption of the reverse assumption with respect to the extension of 
the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions as well as the fact that the Tribunal could 
have reached the same result by applying also the “public policy considerations” of the 
Maffezini decision73 indicate that the interpretation of the MFN clause is characterized by 
antithetic ideological approaches.  
ee. Gas Natural v. Argentina (Lowenfeld, Álvarez, Nikken), 17 June 2005 
The issue in Gas Natural case was whether the MFN clause of the Argentina-Spain BIT 
entitled the investor to bypass the 18-month-clause of the aforementioned treaty by importing 
more favourable provisions of other BITs concluded by Argentina, such as the Argentina-US 
BIT, which did not contain any requirement of prior resort to local courts. 
   
Focussing on the need to ensure the independent and neutral adjudication of investment 
disputes, the Gas Natural Tribunal construed the MFN clause of the Argentina-Spain BIT 
primarily in the light of the historical purpose of international investment arbitration in 
abstracto as follows: 
As the Tribunal sees the history, first of the ICSID Convention, which created the institution of 
investor-state arbitration, and subsequently of the wave of bilateral investment treaties between 
developed and developing countries (and in some instances between developing countries inter 
se), a crucial element – indeed perhaps the most crucial element – has been the provision for 
independent international arbitration of disputes between investors and host states. The creation 
of ICSID and the adoption of bilateral investment treaties offered to investors assurances that 
disputes that might flow from their investments would not be subject to the perceived hazards of 
                                                 
69
 Ibid., para. 204. 
70
 Ibid., para. 223.  
71
 Ibid., para. 227. 
72
 Ibid., para. 226. 
73
 And specifically the third consideration pursuant to which the MFN clause does not apply to situations where 
a dispute settlement clause provides for a particular arbitration forum such as ICSID. See also Freyer/Herlihy, 
supra n. 60, 77. For a brief dogmatic evaluation of the Plama decision from the perspective of the “consent” to 
ICSID arbitration see Tsatsos, supra n. 10, 105.       
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delays and political pressures of adjudication in national courts. (footnote omitted) … The vast 
majority of bilateral investment treaties, and nearly all the recent ones, provide for independent 
international arbitration of investor-state disputes, whether pursuant to the ICSID Convention, 
the ICSID Additional Facility, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or comparable arrangements, 
and such provisions are universally regarded – by opponents as well as by proponents – as 
essential to a regime of protection of foreign direct investment.74 
  
The wording of the MFN clause was taken into account at a second stage.75 Thus, the leading 
element of the interpretational process was an extreme teleological interpretation to which the 
textual interpretation was subordinated. Such a method is inconsistent with the objective 
approach laid down in Article 31 VCLT and, as already indicated in the Maffezini case, does 
not constitute a recognized technique of interpretation of international instruments, but rather 
a policy-oriented approach. Moreover, the contextual element was not taken into account. 
Similar to the Maffezini decision, the demand of Article 31 to perform the interpretation as a 
unified process by applying all three elements was not met. In addition, unlike the cases so far 
presented,76 there was no reference of the VCLT in the corpus of this decision.77 
 
Considering prior ICSID arbitral awards, the Tribunal emphasised that its reasoning and 
conclusions were in substantial agreement with Maffezini and Siemens, and as regards the 
Salini decision it held: 
This Tribunal understands that the issue of applying a general most-favored-nation clause to the 
dispute resolution provisions of bilateral investment treaties is not free from doubt, and that 
different tribunals faced with different facts and negotiating background may reach different 
results. The Tribunal is satisfied, however, that the terms of the BIT between Spain and 
Argentina show that dispute resolution was included within the scope of most-favored-nation 
treatment and that our analysis set out in paragraphs 28-30 above is consistent with the current 
thinking as expressed in other recent arbitral awards.78 (emphasis added) 
 
Comparing Gas Natural and Salini, however, it seems that it was not the terms of the relevant 
MFN clauses, but rather the divergent interpretations and approaches of the respective 
Tribunals that led to opposing conclusions.  
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 Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision of the Tribunal on 
Preliminary Questions on Jurisidiction, 17 June 2005, para. 29, available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/GasNaturalSDG-DecisiononPreliminaryQuestionsonJurisdiction.pdf. 
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 The textual interpretation took place as follows: “The Tribunal notes that the introductory phrase in Article 
IV(2) of the BIT speaks of “all matters governed by the present Agreement…” Certain matters are expressly 
excluded, but there is no exclusion for resolution of disputes.” Ibid., para. 30. 
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 Maffezini, supra n. 49, para. 27 and 36; Siemens, supra n. 57, para. 80-81; Salini, supra n. 62, para. 75 and 
177; Plama, supra n. 67, para. 26, 117, 147, 158, 160, 194, 196. 
77
 In fact, the VCLT is mentioned only once in the twelfth footnote of the decision which reads as follows: “The 
Tribunal notes Argentina’s argument that Spain’s position in the Maffezini case reflects understanding of the 
Spain-Argentina BIT consistent with that of Argentina in this case. We do not believe, however, that an 
argument made by a party in the context of an arbitration reflects practice establishing agreement between the 
parties to a treaty within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”  
78
 Gas Natural, supra n. 74, para. 49. 
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In the end, the Tribunal virtually reversed the Plama principle regarding the function of the 
MFN clause by stating that such provisions “should be understood to be applicable to dispute 
settlement, unless it appears clearly that the state parties to a BIT or the parties to a particular 
investment agreement settled on a different method for resolution of disputes that may 
arise”.79 Finally, the absence of a reference to the Plama case could be explained by the fact 
that the latter was delivered about four months before the Gas Natural decision.  
ff. Suez/AWG v. Argentina (Salacuse, Kaufmann-Kohler, Nikken), 03 August 2006 
Relying on the MFN clause of the Argentina-Spain and Argentina-UK BITs respectively, the 
claimants in Suez case contended that they could bypass the 18-month-clauses laid down in 
the aforementioned treaties by importing the more favourable dispute resolution provision of 
the Argentina-France BIT which did not require prior resort to the local courts. 
    
Before interpreting the MFN clauses, the Suez Tribunal emphasized that its analysis was 
guided by Article 31 of the VCLT, “pursuant to which treaty language is to be interpreted in 
accordance with its ordinary meaning”.80 Indeed, the Tribunal made from the very beginning 
clear that it was going to meet the requirements of the objective approach set out in Article 31 
by stating that: 
the text of the treaty is presumed to be the authentic expression of the parties’ intentions. The 
starting place for any exercise in interpretation is therefore the treaty text itself.81 
 
The process of interpretation in this case was guided by no assumption, and, unlike the 
Maffezini, Siemens, Plama and Gas Natural cases, this Tribunal refrained from articulating 
any general principle with respect to the applicability of MFN clauses to dispute settlement 
provisions. In other words, this decision is case-oriented just as the Salini case. With respect 
to the interpretation of the MFN clauses as such, the Tribunal applied the interpretative steps 
laid down in Article 31 VCLT in a comprehensive way by putting considerable emphasis on 
the textual element82 as well as on the object and purpose83 of the BIT. Finally, it concluded 
that the claimants could take advantage of the more favourable treatment of the third party 
treaty.  
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 Gas Natural, supra n. 74, para. 49. 
80
 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. The Argentine  Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19,) and AWG Group Ltd. v. The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision 
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 Ibid., para. 54. 
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 Ibid., para. 55-58, 61. 
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Next, the Tribunal considered the previous ICSID jurisprudence and distinguished its decision 
thoroughly from the Plama case.84 In the end, it went on to criticize the restrictive assumption 
adopted in Plama by noting:      
The Plama tribunal also stated, in its reasons, that an arbitration agreement must be clear and 
unambiguous, especially where it is incorporated by reference to another text. (footnote omitted) 
This Tribunal does not share this view. As stated above, it believes that dispute resolution 
provisions are subject to interpretation like any other provisions of a treaty, neither more 
restrictive nor more liberal.85 
 
However, there was no reference to the divergent earlier Salini case, where no presumption 
was articulated and the deciding Tribunal emphasized the textual element too. Comparing 
Suez and Salini with each other, it seems that their contradictory outcomes resulted from the 
distinct ways the textual and contextual element were applied as well as from the different 
weight attributed to the object and purpose of the respective BITs. 
gg. Telenor v. Hungary (Goode, Allard, Marriott), 13 September 2006 
Due to the fact that the dispute resolution clause of the Norway-Hungary BIT was limited to 
expropriation claims, the claimant invoked the MFN clause in order to establish ICSID 
jurisdiction over violations of the standard “fair and equitable treatment”. In particular, 
Telenor argued that by virtue of the MFN clause it was entitled to take advantage of any wider 
dispute resolution provision in any other BIT entered into by Hungary with other states.  
 
Before interpreting the MFN clause of the Norway-Hungary BIT, the Tribunal in Telenor 
expressly welcomed the principle articulated in Plama as follows:    
This Tribunal wholeheartedly endorses the analysis and statement of principle furnished by the 
Plama tribunal.86 
 
Thus, the whole process of interpretation was rooted in the assumption that an extension of 
the MFN clause to dispute settlement provisions presupposes the existence of a respective 
“clear” and “unambiguous” wording. Indeed, from a historical viewpoint one could go as far 
as to say that the applicability of the MFN clause to dispute resolution provisions was raised 
to the height of the textual requirements of the interpretative doctrine articulated by Emmerich 
de Vattel in the 18th century.87  
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 Ibid., para. 65. 
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 Ibid., para. 66. 
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 Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award, 13 
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 According to Vattels viewpoint “it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation”, that is, if 
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result of the process of interpretation. See, in particular, Georg Dahm/Jost Delbrück/Rüdiger Wolfrum, 
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Subsequently, the Tribunal put forward four reasons that supported its interpretative 
approach.88 In this context, it rejected the extreme teleological interpretation of the MFN 
clause in the light of the historical purpose of international arbitration in abstracto and 
illustrated an ideological gap in the ICSID jurisprudence by stating: 
Those who advocate a wide interpretation of the MFN clause have almost always examined the 
issue from the perspective of the investor. … The importance to investors of independent 
international arbitration cannot be denied, but in the view of this Tribunal its task is to interpret 
the BIT and for that purpose to apply ordinary canons of interpretation, not to displace, by 
reference to general policy considerations concerning investor protection, the dispute resolution 
mechanism specifically negotiated by the parties.89 
 
Surprisingly, the present Tribunal considered the previous divergent Suez case, which was 
delivered about a month before Telenor, and distinguished its ruling from it.90 The validity of 
the hypothesis posed when presenting the awards in Salini and Gas Natural according to 
which the elapse of four months can justify the non-consideration of previous divergent 
decisions can be, therefore, doubted. 
3. Evaluation 
The ICSID jurisprudence regarding the application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement 
provisions reveals a mosaic of different approaches with respect to its interpretation. 
 
On the one hand, by relying on the preamble of the relevant BIT, the Siemens Tribunal 
articulated an investment-friendly approach as leitmotiv of its interpretation. Consequently, 
the Tribunal recognized from the very beginning of the process of interpretation that 
prominence should be given to the promotion and protection of foreign investments. On the 
other hand, by relying on the principle that an agreement to arbitrate should be clear and 
unambiguous, both ICSID Tribunals in the cases of Plama and Telenor were guided by a 
restrictive approach according to which the application of an MFN clause to dispute 
resolution provisions requires a correspondingly explicit wording of the relevant MFN 
provision. The latter assumption was also endorsed by the Tribunal in Berschader, a 2006 
investment arbitration proceeding under the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Rules which 
                                                                                                                                                        
Völkerrecht, Bd. I/3, 2. Auflage, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2002, 637, para. 3; Sir Robert Jennings/Sir Arthur 
Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. I, 9th Edition, Longman, Great Britain, 1992, 1267, para. 629. 
88
 Telenor, supra n. 86, para. 92-95. 
89
 Telenor, supra n. 86, para. 95. 
90
 Telenor, supra n. 86, para. 98. 
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was published at the beginning of 2008.91 Not surprisingly, the outcome of all these 
proceedings corresponded to the pre-interpretational approach adopted by each Tribunal.  
 
The ICSID Panels in Salini and, most notably, in Suez brought, in turn, a third understanding 
with respect to the interpretation of the MFN clause into play, namely the neutral approach. In 
these cases, the MFN provision was construed without any recourse to pre-interpretational 
guidelines. Again, those decisions led to divergent outcomes as well. However, this can be 
explained by the different weight attributed to the teleological method of interpretation as well 
as by the distinct ways the textual and systematic element were applied. Finally, unlike in the 
cases of Maffezini, Siemens, Plama, Gas Natural, Telenor and Berschader, in both 
aforementioned decisions, the respective ICSID Tribunals refrained from articulating any 
general principle with respect to the relationship between MFN provision and dispute 
settlement mechanism. In other words, the decisions in Salini and Suez are case-specific and 
case-oriented in character. 
 
Furthermore, the process of interpretation in Maffezini and Gas Natural was at odds with the 
rules pursuant to Article 31 VCLT. In particular, the recourse to an extreme teleological 
interpretation of the MFN clause in the light of the historical purpose of international 
arbitration in abstracto constitutes a subjective and not recognized interpretative tool which 
rather reminds one of a policy-oriented understanding. Moreover, by disregarding the 
contextual method, the Maffezini and Gas Natural Tribunals paid no attention to the demand 
of Article 31 to apply the methods it embodies as a unified whole. In the same vein, the 
Tribunal in the Berschader decision, which was rendered outside the ICSID system, held that 
the “starting point in determining whether or not an MFN clause encompasses the dispute 
resolution provisions of other treaties must always be an assessment of the intention of the 
contracting parties upon the conclusion of the original treaty”.92 Again, a subjective reading 
replaced the call of Article 31 for an objective approach in construing international 
agreements as well as the hierarchical relationship between Article 31 and 32 VCLT. As a 
result, these cases do not only disregard the normativity of the rules of interpretation under the 
VCLT, but they also open the door to arbitrary interpretations that undermine the actual will 
of the parties to a BIT. 
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 Berschader v. Russia, SCC Case No. 080/2004, Award, 21 April 2006, para. 178 and 206, available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/BerschaderFinalAward.pdf. 
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 Ibid., para. 178 and 206; see also the criticism raised in the Separate Opinion of Todd Weiler, Ibid., Fn. 15.   
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B. State of Necessity 
1. Introduction 
During its economic reform and the privatization of its public services in the 1990s, Argentina 
concluded numerous BITs, a process that was vividly described as “BIT-Mania”.93  In the late 
1990s, however, Argentina’s economy started facing a deep crisis. In response to the 
economic recession, the Argentine Government took at the beginning of 2002 a number of 
national emergency measures including the termination or suspension of contractual rights of 
investors, the devaluation of its currency (peso), the termination of its policy to calculate 
utility tariffs in US dollars and the conversion of those tariffs into Argentine pesos at the rate 
of one to one (“pesification”).94 Many of these measures affected foreign investments 
adversely. As a result, numerous proceedings were initiated before the ICSID tribunals 
against Argentina by virtue of the respective BITs. Currently, there are about 37 pending 
cases,  most of which relate to the emergency measures taken by Argentina as a response to 
its economic crisis.95 In order to preclude the wrongfulness of its actions and consequently to 
exclude its responsibility for violations of BIT provisions such as “fair and equitable 
treatment”, “expropriation” and “umbrella clause”, Argentina invokes in these proceedings 
state of necessity under customary law as it is embodied in ILC Article 2596 as well as the 
necessity clause of the BITs it has concluded. The cases presented below concern the 
interpretation of the same BIT, namely Article XI of the 1991 Argentina-US BIT,97 relate to 
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the same investment sector, namely to the gas sector, and have the same factual background, 
that is, the Argentine economic crisis.98 
2. Case-law 
aa. CMS v. Argentina (Orrego Vicuña, Lalonde, Rezek), 12 May 2005 
From a structural viewpoint, the CMS Tribunal examined first whether the Argentina crisis 
constituted a necessity under customary law and then it dealt with the examination of the plea 
of necessity under the BIT. However, from a substantive viewpoint, the Court interpreted the 
emergency clause of the BIT in the light of customary necessity, and so the emergency test 
was subordinated to the rigorous conditions enunciated in ILC Article 25. For instance, by 
invoking the customary “only way” test requirement which pursuant to the ILC’s 
Commentary excludes the plea of necessity “if there are other (otherwise lawful) means 
available, even if they may be more costly or less convenient”,99 the Court decided that the 
measures taken by Argentina were not the only steps at its disposal.100 The fact that there have 
been alternative proposals by the economists of the parties appeared to satisfy the Tribunal to 
draw the aforementioned conclusion. This reveals that that as long as alternatives can be 
theoretically conceived, the plea of necessity becomes inactive.101 With respect to the 
economic crisis as such, the Court noted that the crisis was “indeed severe”,102 yet it could not 
be held that the wrongfulness of the actions undertaken by Argentina should be precluded 
because of the relative effects that could be reasonably attributed to the crisis”.103 And without 
being engaged in investigating the actual situation in Argentina during the crisis, it stated “the 
crisis did not result in total economic and social collapse.104    
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bb. LG&E v. Argentina (Bogdanowsky de Maekelt, Rezek, van den Berg), 03 October 
2006 
Unlike the CMS award, the LG&E decision considered the necessity clause of the BIT to be 
lex specialis to the customary necessity. Setting the methodology to be followed, the Tribunal 
held that it should be decided whether the conditions that existed in Argentina during the 
period of crisis could trigger the application of Article XI of the BIT.105 In particular, it was 
emphasized that the defense of necessity derives from the BIT and that general international 
law should be applicable, to the extent required for the interpretation and application of the 
BIT.106 Accordingly, the Tribunal examined whether the crisis could be subsumed under the 
term “essential security interests” of the necessity clause of Article XI. This approach led to a 
qualitatively different standard of necessity than that of the CMS case. For instance, instead of 
applying the rigorous “only way” test, the Tribunal examined whether the measures adopted 
by Argentina were a legitimate, necessary and reasonable response to the crisis in a way that 
reminds one of the proportionality test undertaken by the ECtHR107 as follows: 
A State may have several responses at its disposal to maintain public order or protect its 
essential security interests. In this sense, it is recognized that Argentina’s suspension of the 
calculation of tariffs in U.S. dollars and the PPI adjustment of tariffs was a legitimate way of 
protecting its social and economic system.108 (emphasis added) 
… 
The Tribunal accepts that the provisions of the Emergency Law that abrogated calculation of the 
tariffs in U.S. dollars and PPI adjustments, as well as freezing tariffs were necessary measures 
to deal with the extremely serious economic crisis. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to conclude 
that during this period the Government should have implemented a tariff increase pursuant to an 
index pegged to an economy experiencing a high inflationary period (the United States). The 
severe devaluation of the peso against the dollar renders the Government’s decision to abandon 
the calculation of tariffs in dollars reasonable. Similarly, the Government deemed that freezing 
gas tariffs altogether during the crisis period was necessary[.] 109 (emphasis added) 
 
After establishing that the emergency measures taken by Argentina are excused by virtue of 
the necessity clause of the BIT, the Tribunal affirmed that the customary necessity supported 
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its position too. Again, it appears that its understanding of the “only way” test pursuant to ILC 
Article 25 was influenced by its previous flexible approach,110 since it held that: 
an economic recovery package was the only means to respond to the crisis. Although there may 
have been a number of ways to draft the economic recovery plan, the evidence before the 
Tribunal demonstrates that an across-the-board response was necessary, and the tariffs on public 
utilities had to be addressed.111 (emphasis added) 
 
Compared to the CMS award, furthermore, the severity of the situation in Argentina was 
evaluated divergently too. In particular, after dealing with the social, economic and political 
dimensions of an “extremely severe crisis”112, the Tribunal equated its intensity to a military 
invasion.113 Surprisingly, when dealing with the question of necessity, the LG&E Tribunal 
neither mentions nor cites the previous divergent CMS award,114 although one of the 
arbitrators on the two tribunals was identical.115  
cc. Enron v. Argentina (Orrego Vicuña, van den Berg, Tschanz), 22 May 2007 
A similar pattern to CMS was followed by the award in Enron which applied the standard of 
necessity pursuant to ILC Article 25. The Tribunal found that Argentina did not meet the 
requirements of the rigorous conditions set. It justified its methodological approach by 
holding  that the lack of a definition of the term “essential security interests” under Art. XI of 
the BIT made reliance on the requirement of the customary standard embodied in Article 25 
necessary.116 Thus, “the treaty becomes inseparable from the customary law”.117 Finally, just 
as in CMS, the intensity of the crisis was not capable of precluding the wrongfulness of the 
measures adopted by Argentina. The most important aspect of this award is, however, that, 
when dealing with the issue of necessity,118 the Enron Tribunal refrained from considering the 
prior divergent award in LG&E, although one of the arbitrators on the two tribunals was 
identical. 
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dd. CMS v. Argentina (Guillaume, Nabil Elrabi, Crawford), Annulment Decision, 25 
September 2007 
The ad hoc Committee identified two manifest errors of law with respect to the 
interpretational process followed by the CMS Tribunal. First, the CMS Tribunal had 
considered the requirements under Article XI as being the same as those under ILC Article 
25.119 Second, it had assumed that Article XI and Article 25 were on the same footing without 
taking a position on their relationship.120 In this context, the Tribunal went on to emphasize 
“in any case, the excuse based on customary international law could only be subsidiary to the 
exclusion based on Article XI” and proposed two possible readings as to the relation of 
Article XI and customary law, both of which conferred priority to the treaty provision over 
ILC Article 25.121 Thus, silently endorsing the methodology followed in LG&E, the 
Committee rejected the CMS and, consequently, the Enron understandings of the necessity 
plea and through its non binding proposal it appears to have given some guidelines to future 
tribunals in order to close the gaps in the case-law regarding the issue of necessity.122 
Nonetheless, pursuant to the current institutional structure of the ICSID system it was not 
authorized to review the errors identified. 
ee. Sempra v. Argentina (Orrego Vicuña, Lalonde, Morelli Rico), 28 September 2007 
After noting that two arbitrators of the present Tribunal were also members of the Tribunal 
which adjudicated the case CMS in 2005, the Sempra award emphasized that in the present 
case the interpretation of the BIT as well as the assessment of the facts were different from the 
LG&E decision.123 In fact, only three days after the annulment proceedings in CMS, the award 
in Sempra endorsed expressly the awards in CMS and Enron and construed the necessity 
clause of the BIT in the light of ILC Article 25. Thus, it applied the rigorous customary 
necessity standard, a methodological process that the ad hoc Committee had already 
characterized as manifest error of law. Hence, the heterogeneity of the ICSID case-law 
regarding the issue of necessity changed its course from that of horizontality, i.e. between 
ICSID tribunals, to that of verticality, i.e. between a tribunal and the ad hoc Committee. 
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3. Evaluation 
The ICSID case-law regarding the Argentine crisis illustrates serious inconsistencies 
notwithstanding the fact that the respective ICSID Tribunals were dealing with disputes 
having the same factual background, concerning the interpretation of the same BIT and 
relating to the same investment sector.  
 
By following two different methodological approaches, the ICSID Tribunals applied two 
different standards of scrutiny for assessing the national emergency measures taken by 
Argentina. On the one hand, in CMS, Enron and Sempra the Tribunals interpreted the 
necessity clause of the Argentina-US BIT in the light of customary international law. Thus, by 
applying the rigorous customary standard of ILC Art. 25, they rejected the plea of necessity. 
In fact, such an interpretation of the BIT appears to reflect the principle of “systemic 
integration” laid down in Article 31(3)(c) VCLT which reads as follows: 
There shall be taken into account together with the context any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties.    
 
As the International Law Commission pointed out in its Report on Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law in 2006, this provision refers to “rules 
of international law” in general, thus covering all of its sources, including customary law.124 
Indeed, when justifying the interpretation of the BIT in the light of customary law, the 
Tribunal in Sempra emphasised inter alia that “[i]nternational law is not a fragmented body of 
law as far as basic principles are concerned and necessity is no doubt one such basic 
principle“.125 On the other hand, the Tribunal in LG&E considered the necessity clause of the 
BIT to be lex specialis to the customary necessity. Hence, the plea of necessity was accepted, 
since the standard of scrutiny to be applied was a flexible one, including a form of 
proportionality test instead of the rigorous “only way” requirement of ILC Article 25.   
 
Nevertheless, the most irritating feature of these cases is that the Tribunals in Enron and 
LG&E did not consider the previous antithetic awards LG&E and CMS respectively, 
notwithstanding the fact that there was a common arbitrator in each of both divergent pairs of 
decisions. That creates the duel CMS-LG&E and LG&E-Enron. In addition, this ignoring took 
place only when the LG&E and Enron Tribunals went on to deal with the plea of necessity. 
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Therefore, the non-consideration of the prior divergent awards appears to be deliberate. 126 
Yet, there is at least a deontological duty for Tribunals administered by an institution which is 
supposed to constitute “a significant step forward toward the establishment of the Rule of 
Law in international investment”127 to take into account previous divergent decisions. 
Remarkably, the CMS and Enron Tribunals which followed the same methodology and 
reached the same conclusion were presided over by the same arbitrator. Aside from the fact 
that the standard of necessity varied from one ICSID Panel to another, it appears that the 
methodology and the result of the procedure in those cases were significantly influenced by 
the president of each respective Tribunal.128 
 
V. Assessment of Homogeneity 
The homogeneity test of the ICSID jurisprudence in the era of “treatification” of  international 
investment law129 reveals that identical and similar provisions of BITs are interpreted and 
applied differently according to the composition of the relevant ICSID tribunals. In fact, the 
awards in Plama and Telenor demonstrate, first, that ICSID tribunals themselves recognize 
that the case-law develops inconsistently and, second, that panels do not hesitate to criticize 
the interpretative approaches taken in other ICSID cases harshly. Finally, the annulment 
proceedings in CMS and the Enron award show that the inconsistencies relating to the 
standards upon which investment disputes should be adjudicated exceed the horizontal course, 
that is, between tribunals standing on an equal footing, and develop a vertical dimension, 
namely between ICSID tribunals and the ad hoc Committee itself.   
 
In construing BITs, the majority of the tribunals is guided by different approaches whose 
formulation is based on specific principles they put forward. So, the Tribunal in Siemens 
derived from the preamble of the BIT an investment-friendly approach according to which the 
interpretation of the BIT should be guided by its object and purpose, namely the promotion 
and the protection of foreign investments. In contrast, the process of interpretation in Plama 
and Telenor rested upon the assumption that an extension of MFN clauses to dispute 
settlement procedures required a clear and unambiguous wording, that is, a rather host-state-
friendly approach. The formulation of such opposite assumptions which determine the course 
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of the interpretation and, thus, the outcome of the proceedings, reflects the question of the 
adherence of the adjudicator to prejudgments according to her or his origin, education and 
social environment, namely the issue of different preunderstandings (“Vorverständnisse”). 130 
Indeed, in spite of the fact that the rules of interpretation embodied in the VCLT are relatively 
clear, these rules are not capable of tackling the question of varying preunderstandings. 
Therefore, whilst for some ICSID tribunals the protection of foreign investments is 
prominent, for other tribunals the protection of the interests of the host-state receives priority. 
In addition to that, in the Suez decision the protection and promotion of foreign investments 
stood on the same footing as the preservation of a fair balance between host-state and 
investor. In other words, the process of interpretation was rooted in a rather neutral approach. 
As a result, at the level of preunderstanding there is a split of the ICSID jurisprudence into 
three different ideological streams. 
 
It should be added, however, that the influential potential of preunderstandings should be 
restricted when a system itself provides for the direction that an interpretation has to follow. 
As early as the 1960s, the Report of the Executive Directors of the World Bank emphasized 
that the ICSID Convention itself maintains a careful balance between the interests of foreign 
private investors and those of the host-states.131 Moreover, about twenty-five years ago the 
balanced approach regarding the course of interpretation in ICSID procedures was 
underscored in the first Amco award as a reflection of the legal-economic neutrality inherent 
to the ICSID Convention in the following way: 
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[T]he Convention is aimed to protect, to the same extent and with the same vigour the investor 
and the host-state, not forgetting that to protect investments is to protect the general interest of 
development and of developing countries. 132  
 
Indeed, a dispute settlement system such as the ICSID established to promote foreign 
investments by way of negating the political considerations which the diplomatic protection 
involves as well as the subjective preferences which the adjudication of investment disputes 
by national courts can entail133 should not display the irregularities that itself intends to 
remedy. Needles to say, that in the recent past the fact that the ICSID jurisprudence is 
permeated by such preunderstandings has been subject to political criticism. By a notice of 1 
May 2007, the Government of Bolivia denounced the ICSID Convention.134 The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Bolivia justified this action inter alia by referring to the ideologisation of 
the ICSID jurisprudence as well as to the inability of the ICSID system to ensure a consistent 
development of its case-law.135 It appears, therefore, that interpretative approaches which do 
not reflect the legal and economic balance of interests that the ICSID Convention intends to 
maintain put the credibility and, consequently, the existence of the ICSID arbitration in 
question. It will be interesting to learn whether and to what extent “alternatives” to the ICSID 
system such as ad hoc and institutional arbitration136 or the substantive and procedural 
framework for the protection of property under the ECHR137 will experience an increase in 
their case-law with respect to investment-related disputes.  
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An additional factor of heterogeneity is constituted by the different weight attributed to a 
particular element of interpretation embodied in the “general  rule” of Article 31 VCLT. It is 
beyond doubt that there is no hierarchical order between the text, the context as well as the 
object and purpose of a treaty, for all these elements represent a unified logical whole. The 
fact that by virtue of the objective approach the starting point of interpretation is the text 
reflects a temporal, but not a qualitative priority of the textual element. Because of the 
equality between these elements, divergences in the jurisprudence which result from the 
attribution of more or less weight to a particular element of interpretation are natural, since 
the VCLT establishes a hierarchical order only between the “general rule” embodied in 
Article 31 and the “supplementary means of interpretation” under Article 32. The same holds 
true, for inconsistencies which emanate from the different way in which a specific element of 
interpretation is applied. In fact, the elements of interpretation do not require automatic 
application; instead, ICSID tribunals may have various alternatives at their disposal as regards 
the inclusion of one particular element in the process of interpretation. As a result, the 
divergent outcomes in Salini and Suez, where the textual and the contextual interpretation 
were performed differently and distinct weight was attributed to the object and purpose of the 
relevant treaty, stem from the leeway the VCLT itself provides.  
 
Furthermore, there are divergences in the ICSID case-law which neither the flexibility of the 
rules of interpretation nor the distinct preunderstandings (“Vorverständnisse”) can justify. 
 
Firstly, this category includes decisions where a previous divergent award is not taken into 
consideration and, therefore, an ICSID tribunal does not deal with such a divergence. With 
respect to the MFN clause, it can be doubted whether the elapse of four months since the 
publication of a previous decision is an insufficient period of time that can justify the non-
consideration of a prior divergent decision. The latter was the case in Salini and Gas Natural, 
which did not consider the Siemens and Plama decisions respectively. However, the ICSID 
Court in Telenor considered the antithetic Suez decision, which was published one month 
earlier, and differentiated its ruling from it. Yet, the first three awards regarding the existence 
of a state of necessity in Argentina constitute clear and indisputable examples of disregard for 
previous ICSID awards. Although the CMS, LG&E and Enron cases had the same factual 
background, concerned the gas sector and were related to the interpretation of the necessity 
clause of the Argentina-US BIT, prior divergent ICSID jurisprudence was not taken into 
account. Such ignoring reveals dramatic dimensions given the fact that in the cases of LG&E 
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and Enron there was an arbitrator who sat on the previous Tribunal which had rendered an 
antithetic award, namely the awards in CMS and in LG&E respectively, and that the CMS and 
Enron awards which followed the same methodology and, thus, came to the same result were 
presided over by the same arbitrator. In addition to the similarity of these cases, one could 
have expected that no more than the one-third continuity in the composition of these 
Tribunals should have led them to deal with the previous divergent awards. Instead, such a 
deliberate ignoring poses the question whether it can be attributed to different power 
dynamics with respect to the composition of the Tribunals.   
 
Moreover, the decisions which do not follow a method of interpretation consistent to the 
VCLT, that is, decisions applying not recognized rules of interpretation and failing to perform 
the interpretation as a unified and holistic process in terms of Article 31 VCLT, belong to the 
class of unjustifiable heterogeneity as well. As such are qualified the methods followed in the 
cases of Maffezini and Gas Natural where the MFN clause was primarily construed on the 
basis of the historical purpose of international arbitration in abstracto and no attention was 
paid to the systematic element. In fact, such techniques constitute policy-oriented approaches 
and deprive the process of interpretation of its normative character. In other words, they open 
the door to outcomes according to subjective considerations and preferences. 
 
Hence, the non-consideration of previous awards dealing with identical or similar legal and 
factual questions as well as the disregard for the internationally recognized method of 
interpretation indicate that some ICSID tribunals proceed as if they were bound neither by 
deontological nor by legal rules.      
 
The jurisprudence examined demonstrates that a considerable part of inconsistencies 
originates from opposite ideological approaches which serve as guidelines to the process of 
interpretation as well as from the fact that no attention is paid to previous divergent ICSID 
awards and to the rules of interpretation under the VCLT. As a result, by allowing the 
emergence of such divergences in the ICSID jurisprudence, the exclusion of appeal pursuant 
to Article 53 of the ICSID Convention shows a serious institutional deficit which causes legal 
uncertainty and questions the credibility of the ICSID system. This begs the question: Which 
mechanisms could possibly heal the institutional pathology of the ICSID system? 
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VI. Reform Proposals 
A. Preventive Mechanisms 
1. ICSID Advocate-Generals 
From a preventive viewpoint, the homogeneity of the ICSID jurisprudence could be 
strengthened through the introduction of an institution similar to the Advocate-Generals 
pursuant to article 222 of the EC Treaty. Accordingly, the EC Advocate-General has the 
“duty, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned 
submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the ECJ, require his 
involvement.” The Advocate-Generals represent neither interests of the parties to a dispute 
nor interests of European Organs. They only serve the European Law.138 Their essential 
function is to deliver an opinion advising the Court on how the case in issue should be 
decided. In fact, their non-binding opinions contain a thorough assessment of the case before 
the ECJ as to the facts and the law, including a detailed and critical analysis of the ECJ 
jurisprudence as well as comments on the development of the law in the area concerned.139 In 
this way, this form of a horizontal judicial dialogue makes a substantial contribution to the 
coherence and consistency of the ECJ case-law.140 A similar institution could be transferred to 
the ICSID system through an amendment of the ICSID Rules which would require a two-third 
majority of the members of the ICSID Administrative Council.141 Unlike in the case of EC 
Advocate-Generals, the composition of non-binding submissions by the ICSID Advocate-
Generals would depend on a request of the party-appointed arbitrators.           
2. ICSID Preliminary Rulings 
While the institution of the EC Advocate-Generals describes a form of horizontal judicial 
dialogue, the institution of preliminary rulings under Article 234 of the EC Treaty makes clear 
that the European law has to be interpreted consistently at a vertical level as well, that is by 
the national courts of the EC member states.142 Accordingly, if a national court finds that it 
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has to decide a question of European law in a case pending before it, it will suspend the 
proceedings and refer the question to the ECJ. Finally, the domestic court decides the case 
before it on the basis of the binding response of the ECJ. 
A system analogous to Article 234 of the EC Treaty143 could supplement the suggested model 
of the ICSID Advocates-Generals, since the request for an opinion to be delivered by the 
ICSID Advocate-Generals would always require the cooperation of the party-appointed 
arbitrators. Hence, the safeguarding of consistency in the ICSID case-law could be secured to 
a greater extent by way of granting to the president of each ICSID tribunal a discretionary 
margin to suspend an ICSID procedure in order to request an opinion by the ICSID Advocate-
Generals. The request as such could concern legal questions that have never been dealt by a 
Tribunal before, a situation where an ICSID Tribunal wants to depart from previous 
jurisprudence or when a panel has to deal with an issue that has already been decided 
contradictory.144 Again, such a reform could also take place by a two-third majority decision 
of the members of the ICSID Administrative Council.145 Finally, establishing an option for 
preliminary rulings depending on the initiative of the president of an ICSID panel could lead 
to a de facto institutionalization of the model of ICSID Advocate-Generals             
3. Evaluation 
 Although the aforementioned proposals could contribute to the homogenization of the ICSID 
case-law without requiring an amendment of the ICSID Convention, as such they are not 
capable of guaranteeing a homogenous jurisprudence and protection from unjust decisions. 
They are merely piecemeal measures of non-binding and preventive character, since the 
ICSID Convention grants binding force and decision-monopoly as regards the assessment of 
issues of law or of fact in a given case exclusively to the ICSID panels. In other words, the 
creation of a more far-reaching mechanism is necessary. To this purpose, a recourse to the 
domestic law may be helpful. Indeed, at the domestic level, pathological case-law is subject to 
review by permanent and hierarchically superior courts. As far as the control powers of the 
superior instances concern only the legal aspects of the initial decision, the model of review 
corresponds to the concept of cassation. On the other hand, judicial control instances 
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competent to examine whether a case was wrongly or rightly decided both as to the law and 
the facts reflect the concept of appeal.146 More often than not, however, this terminological 
distinction does not reflect accurately the actual scope of review of the hierarchically superior 
instance.147 Be that as it may, in both constellations the underlying principle is the 
maintenance of confidence in the process of adjudication by securing consistency in the 
jurisprudence as well as in the interpretation and application of the law.148 Of course, the 
option of an ICSID appeals mechanism did not elude the attention of the ICSID Secretariat.    
 
B. An ICSID Appeals Mechanism. 
1. The Reform Proposal of the ICSID Secretary: A Non-standing Treaty-dependent 
Appeals Mechanism  
The Discussion Paper of 2004 foresaw the establishment of a non-standing ICSID appeals 
mechanism. Accordingly, the appellate tribunal would be constituted for any new appellate 
procedure afresh, and would be composed, unless the disputing parties agreed otherwise, of 
three members.149 The members of the ad hoc appellate tribunal would be selected from a 
panel of 15 persons.150 Moreover, the scope of the appellate review would extend to matters 
concerning clear errors of law, serious errors of fact as well as the five grounds of the 
annulment procedure set out in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.151 Finally, the appeal 
tribunal would be capable of upholding, modifying or reversing the initial award.152  
 
However, such a reform requires an amendment pursuant to Article 66 of the ICSID 
Convention. This is so because Article 53 of the ICSID Convention excludes the possibility of 
appeal in an explicit and absolute way.153 While the amendment of the Additional Facility 
Rules can be done with a two-third majority of the members of the ICSID Administrative 
Council, Article 66 requires an additional ratification, acceptance or approval of such an 
amendment by all contracting states to the ICSID Convention, namely by 143 nations. Trying 
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to overcome this actual difficulty, the ICSID Discussion Paper referred to Article 41 VCLT. 
Accordingly two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may under certain conditions 
conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves alone.154 As a result, 
appellate review of an ICSID award would be possible under the condition that two or more 
states express their consent in an international investment treaty to permit such a review.155 In 
the words of the Discussion Paper: “[i]n any event, availability of the Appeals Facility would 
in all cases depend on the consent of the parties”.156 
2. Evaluation 
Of predominant importance for securing the harmonious development of jurisprudence is 
personal and institutional continuity. Consequently, an ad hoc appeals mechanism would not 
be able to warrant a homogenous case-law. Indeed, the ICSID annulment jurisprudence has 
already shown that the personal discontinuity of the ad hoc Committee has hindered the 
consistent interpretation of the terms embodied in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.157 
Furthermore, if the ICSID appeals mechanism was a non-standing institution, there could 
emerge conflicts of interest given the fact that the members of the Appeals Facility could also 
be engaged in other cases as counsels or first instance arbitrators.158 The neutrality and 
impartiality of the procedure could be, therefore, called into question. Consequently, the 
proposal of the Discussion Paper according to which an appeal would be carried by a three-
member tribunal whose members would be selected from a panel of fifteen seems to be 
inappropriate. A possible appellate institution must become a permanent organ. 
 
Moreover, it is highly doubtable whether an appeal procedure based on the provisions of 
international investment treaties could ever guarantee a constant jurisprudence. An inter se 
modification of the ICSID Convention for this purpose means only that appeal will be 
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possible for some cases, but not for others. Such a mechanism would constitute a kind of 
semi-appeal.159 Furthermore, states can, according to their power and bargaining/negotiating 
strength, introduce ICSID appeal clauses to an investment treaty in order to favour themselves 
or their respective investors. However, such a selectivity underestimates the significance of a 
homogenous jurisprudence and undermines every effort to institutionalise it. In fact, a reform 
intending to secure the coherence in the case-law would require a more stable and 
comprehensive institutional structure, namely an ICSID mechanism aiming to be effective for 
all ICSID member states. 
3. A Comprehensive ICSID Appeals Mechanism? 
aa. Problem: Pacta Sunt Servanda v. Need for Reform 
In spite of the fact that the homogeneity test of the ICSID jurisprudence reveals that the 
prohibition of appeal according to Article 53 constitutes a serious institutional deficit, a 
conventional amendment of the ICSID Convention pursuant to article 66 appears to be “to 
complex to be realistic”,160 since it requires the consent of 143 member states. In other words, 
according to the existing positive law, its is not permitted to the majority of the ICSID 
member states to create an ICSID appeals mechanism which would apply for all parties to the 
ICSID Convention. The principle is clear, rigid and without any ambiguity: pacta sunt 
servanda. Yet, it has proved necessary to soften the rigidity of pacta sunt servanda.161 This 
begs the question: Which elements of law could pierce the armour of the principle pacta sunt 
servanda in order to allow the creation of an appeals mechanism within the ICSID system? 
bb. Attempting to Tackle the Problem 
i).  Institutional-creative Function of the Teleological Element 
The first element that comes into consideration is the substantive rule upon which the entire 
ICSID system is based, namely the telos of the fair and neutral settlement of investment 
disputes. This would not be the first time where a recourse to the purpose of the ICSID system 
brought about a change in it. Indeed, it was the teleological element that led the ad hoc 
Committee in the first two annulment proceedings in Klöckner I  and Amco I to perform an 
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appellate review instead of annulment.162 In particular, the ad hoc Committee in Klöckner I 
pointed out: 
Application of the [first] paragraph [of Article 52 of the Convention] demands neither a narrow 
interpretation, nor a broad interpretation, but an appropriate interpretation, taking into account 
the legitimate concern to surround the exercise of the remedy to the maximum extent possible 
with guarantees in order to achieve a harmonious balance between the various objectives of the 
Convention.163 (emphasis added)    
 
[T]he rules in Section 5 of the Convention regarding the interpretation, revision and annulment 
of the award (Articles 50 to 52) are part of the same system and must be interpreted according to 
the customary principles of interpretation, including the principle of effectiveness.164 (emphasis 
added)   
 
The ad hoc Committee … has the power and the duty to interpret Article 52(1)(e). In doing so, it 
adopts neither a narrow interpretation nor a broad interpretation, but it bears in mind the 
customary principles of treaty interpretation and, in particular, the objective of the Convention 
and of the system it establishes.165 (emphasis added) 
    
Endorsing the teleological approach adopted in Klöckner I, the ad hoc Committee in Amco I 
emphasised:  
The absence, however, of a rule of stare decisis in the ICSID arbitration system does not prevent 
this ad hoc Committee from sharing the interpretation given to Article 52(1)(e) by the Klockner 
ad hoc Committee.166 
 
In other words, the teleological element has caused a temporary institutional transformation 
within the ICSID system. More importantly, in addition to the institutional transformation, the 
international teleological element has led to the creation of international institutions and, in 
particular, of international judicial bodies by an organ which under conventional 
understanding was not empowered to do so. This was done by none other than the Security 
Council of the United Nations. For the purpose of maintaining the international peace and 
security, Chapter VII of the UN Charter was interpreted in such a way that authorised the 
Security Council to establish the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia167  and 
Rwanda168 in 1993 and 1994 respectively.169 Hence, the institutional-creative function of the 
teleological element within the international order constitutes the first reform-supporting 
force. 
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ii). Principle of Systemic Integration.  
In its Namibia Advisory Opinion of June 21 1971, the ICJ emphasized that:  
an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire 
legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.170 
 
This statement reflects the principle of systemic integration enunciated in Article 31(3)(c). 
The release of the integrative forces enclosed in this principle would require the determination 
of the location of the ICSID system within the international order. Consequently, it has to be 
examined whether international law provides for appeal mechanisms aiming to secure 
consistency in the jurisprudence with respect to disputes concerning private property or, more 
specifically investments, and, if it does, to what extent these international topoi are similar to 
the ICSID system. 
 
The paramount importance of appeal within the international order is underlined by the fact 
that it is recognized as a fundamental human right in Article 14(5) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR). Accordingly, “everyone convicted 
of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher 
tribunal according to law.” In addition, the entire Article 14 ICCPR, and thus Art. 14(5) as 
well, has been already recognised by the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations as a 
right from which derogation in situations of public emergency is not permitted.171 In the same 
vein, the right to appeal is guaranteed when individuals are called to account for grave crimes 
which they might have committed. The Statutes of the International Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda provide for appellate proceedings against first instance decisions.172 
It goes without saying that the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court which was 
agreed upon in 1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002 follows the same pattern as well.173 
Of course, the possibility of appeal is not restricted to situations where the criminal element 
takes centre stage, but is also available in areas of international law concerning the judicial 
protection of private property and of investments respectively.     
 
The first system that comes into consideration is the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR). Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to the ECHR is dedicated to the protection 
of property. Accordingly, “every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment 
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of his possessions”. As regards the procedural protection, any person, non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals has under 34 ECHR the right to bring to the ECtHR 
applications concerning violations of the Convention or the protocols thereto by a member 
state. The fundamental reform, made effective in 1998 by the Additional Protocol No. 11, 
established the compulsory jurisdiction of the ECtHR, thus enabling applicants to bring their 
claims directly before the Court.  The latter procedural guarantee is comparable to the initiation 
of an “arbitration without privity” proceeding before the ICSID Tribunals by investors claiming 
the infringement of substantive provisions laid down in a BIT by the host-state. Indeed, in both 
cases, unidentified individuals have the right of recourse against a state when they feel that the 
latter has violated its obligation to treat them pursuant to the provisions of an international 
treaty.174 That is to say, foreign investors can claim compensation for infringement of their 
property by the host-state before the ECtHR. Notably, in the dispute over Iron & Steel Works, 
two Italian investors brought their claim against the Republic of Georgia initially before the 
ECtHR, but in 2006 they changed course and brought their case before an ICSID Tribunal.175 
This incident, as well, reveals how close to each other both institutional structures are located.           
 
As already mentioned, investment treaties contributed to the explosion of the ICSID 
jurisprudence.176 Similarly, the reform operated by Protocol No. 11 led to an explosion of the 
case-law of the ECtHR.177 Furthermore, by suppressing the European Commission of Human 
Rights, Protocol No. 11 managed to depoliticise the protection of human rights in Europe,178 a 
feature similar to the depoliticisation of the settlement of investment disputes under the ICSID 
Convention. Admittedly, Protocol No. 11 attached special importance to questions concerning 
the quality and the consistency of the Court’s case-law.179 Pursuant to Article 43(1) ECHR, 
“within a period of three months from the date of the judgment of the Chamber, any party to 
the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber”. 
The acceptance of such a request presupposes, according to Article 43(1) ECHR, that “the 
case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or 
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the protocols thereto, or a serious issue of general importance.”180 A “serious question 
affecting the interpretation” is inter alia present when the judgment concerned is at odds with 
a prior judgment or when the decision is crucial for the future development of the case-law.181 
In addition to this, the Grand Chamber has jurisdiction to decide on serious questions of fact 
which can be generalized, thus becoming relevant for future cases.182 Although not expressly 
mentioned, the referral to the Grand Chamber under Article 43 is equal to an appeals 
procedure.183 Similar to the role of the ICSID within the framework of investment protection, 
the ECHR as reformed by the Protocol No. 11, which provides among others for an 
institutionalised appeals procedure as well as for a compulsory individual application, aims at 
creating an effective international mechanism of legal protection. 
 
Although the law of the World Trade Organization, established in 1994, concerns principally 
trade issues, it also contains several investment-related provisions laid down in four 
agreements, namely in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).184 Disputes between WTO members 
concerning their rights and obligations under the aforementioned investment-related 
agreements are to be settled according to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). The latter dispute settlement mechanism has 
replaced the prior power-oriented diplomatic settlement system of the GATT 1947 with a 
rule-oriented procedure of settlement.185 A distinctive feature of the depoliticization, or rather 
the judicialization, of the dispute settlement accomplished by the DSU constitutes, among 
others, the establishment of the standing WTO Appellate Body.186  
 
Similar to the ICSID system, the settlement of disputes within the WTO is carried out by 
panels, whereas within the framework of the WTO only states or custom territories are 
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authorized to make a request for the establishment of a panel.187 Like in case of ICSID, the 
WTO panels consist principally of three panellists whose competence and expertise shows, in 
turn, considerable similarities to those of the ICSID.188 Against panel reports, however, any 
party to a dispute may request an appeal from the WTO Appellate Body. The latter does not 
deal with factual findings. Its scope of review concerns issues of law covered in a panel report 
as well as legal interpretations developed by a panel, and it may uphold, modify or reverse the 
legal findings and conclusions of the panels.189 In other words, the reformed world trade 
system provides for a second instance entrusted with the duty to secure coherence in 
jurisprudence as well as the proper interpretation of law. 
 
Comparing all three international systems with each other, one might conclude that from a 
systemic-institutional viewpoint the ICSID system is located between the ECHR and the 
WTO. The international integrative forces that operate in the space between WTO and ECHR 
and circle the ICSID system are released and affect both sides of the ICSID system in order to 
soften the institutional arrhythmia of the ICSID Convention, which consists in its lack of an 
appeals mechanism when compared to its two parallel existing international systems. Hence, 
the principle of systemic integration constitutes the second reform-supporting force. 
 
iii). Principle of Good Faith 
Article 31 VCLT establishes that treaties shall be interpreted in good faith. This principle 
“flows directly from the rule pacta sunt servanda, which is enshrined in Article 26 VCLT, 
and governs the whole process of interpretation.190 The rule of good faith as enshrined in 
Article 31 VCLT indicates that the process of interpretation should not lead to manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable results.191 This reflects the negative side of the general principle of 
good faith which consists in offering protection to “certain finalities anchored in the common 
interest against excessive individualist pretenses”.192 To the negative side of this general rule 
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belong, furthermore, the protection against acts which deprive the object and purpose of an 
international transaction e.g. an international treaty.193 On the other hand, the positive side of 
the general principle of good faith consists in enlarging the scope of application of an existing 
legal rule to such an extent that the latter can be adjusted to new actual needs and 
requirements.194 This aspect of the principle portrays its so-called gap-filling and legal 
development function.195 Indeed, it is not a coincidence that already in the mid-1950s the 
principle of good faith was qualified as a  „fundamental principle“ of international law.196  
 
Due to the fact that some ICSID panels applied unreasonable and irrational interpretations, 
that an adjustment of the ICSID Convention to the present needs is opposed by insuperable 
institutional obstacles and that in a considerable part of the ICSID jurisprudence the exercise 
of the judicial function puts the object and purpose of the ICSID system, namely the neutral 
and free of ideological considerations settlement of investment disputes, into question, the 
general principle of good faith becomes activated. Since the institutional deficit from which 
the ICSID system suffers allows the ICSID jurisprudence to fragment, the principle of good 
faith must act upon Article 66 of the ICSID Convention which subjects the creation of a 
comprehensive appeals mechanism to the will of all ICSID contracting parties.197 The 
principle of good faith supported by the principle of systemic integration as well as by the 
institutions-creative power of the teleological element can soften the harshness of the 
proposition pacta sunt servanda in order to enable the creation of an ICSID appeals 
mechanism. Thus, the establishment of a comprehensive ICSID appeals institution becomes 
possible, even if this does not correspond to the will of all ICSID contracting states.198 
4. Thesis 
Leaving aside any effort to soften the harshness of the proposition pacta sunt servanda, the 
problem is a real and existing one. The ICSID system is no longer able to follow its initial 
purpose. Institutionally, the ICSID Convention constitutes a rigid and inflexible treaty without 
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any possibility for improvement, that is, a treaty without future. Ideologically, the ICSID 
jurisprudence is inconsistent, for a considerable proportion of ICSID Tribunals serve not only 
different, but also essentially contradictory values. Now, the ICSID system seems to have two 
possibilities to choose from: Either a comprehensive appeals mechanism will be established, 
or it will follow the path of the “obsolete treaties”. Indeed, when the League of the Nations 
proved to be unable to serve its purposes, it was replaced. The same can happen here as well.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
Neither the different cultural traditions of international arbitrators nor their different origin 
can justify contradictory awards. In the final analysis, they are subject to one legal order; that 
of international law.199 Systemically, the question “quis custodiet ipsos custodies” will always 
remain unanswered. Jurists are responsible for themselves. And the actual citadel of the fair 
and balanced adjudication are neither the rules of interpretation nor the recognized 
competence, but the values to which jurists have devoted themselves.200 At this point, the 
strive for homogeneity of Zaleukos meets the aphoristic saying of Herakleitos: “The hidden 
harmony is better than the obvious”.201 
There remains the hope for a future development of international law towards the Rule of 
Law202. 
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